Provisions of the State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development during 2006-2011 stipulate execution of a range of tasks that are key to further development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Among those tasks, the one worth mentioning is establishment of the Joint Operational Command.
The Mission
New threats to the development of the international security system are taking shape today. There is change in types of threats to national security of countries, especially in the military domain. All this impels one to revise one’s outlook on directions of the armed forces development.
Lessons learnt by armed forces of developed countries manifest that the general trend in their development was to abandon the concept of numerous armed forces with a cumbersome multilevel command and control system. This is connected with restated principles of warfare and reduced probability of a large-scale war on the one hand and essentially increased command and control requirements on the other hand. Another discernible trend in development of other countries’ armies is adoption of new automated weapons and a wide-spread utilization of automated command and control systems (which allows of considerable reduction in personnel number) and their integration with intelligence, surveillance, navigation and space support systems. All these measures make it possible even today, in some cases, to accomplish a number of (combat) mission tasks in real time.
Lessons learnt by armed forces of developed countries and results of the Defence Review 2005 were used for development and implementation of the State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development during 2006-2011. This Programme stipulated transition to a three-step command and control system (the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – the Joint Operational Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – a Task Force, an Army Corps, an Air Command) supported by due distribution of functions.
To meet the requirements of the aforementioned Programme, an operational level command and control structure, entirely new to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was established. This new structure was the Joint Operational Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (the JOC) and the main tasks identified for it were operational planning for employment as well as command and control of:
joint (multiservice) formation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during military conflicts and crisis situations;
peacekeeping contingents of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
capabilities assigned to antiterrorist operations and crisis relief operations (natural and anthropogenic) at the national (regional) level.
The Level Achieved
Establishment of the JOC makes it possible to have a C2 structure on permanent standby to respond to main threats to the state security both in peacetime and in the special period.
The three years that have elapsed since the official establishment of the JOC haven’t been wasted. Today the JOC already executes command and control of capabilities assigned for emergency (crisis response) operations in peacetime and Ukrainian peacekeeping contingents abroad. It also makes operational plans for employment of forces in special period. The JOC has also been repeatedly engaged to execute command and control of assigned UAF units in disaster relief operations, both natural and man-made, during 2007-2010.
It should also be noted that the JOC is effectively the only C2 element whose table of organization is maximally close to that of modern command posts. Besides, unlike the UAF Service Commands and Operational Commands, the JOC has within its structure components designed for command and control of units from all the three Services as well as those of special operations forces. The JOC also has such unique units as, for instance, Civil-Military Cooperation Cell. Such units, to mention in only in passing, are not to be found in other operational level command and control structures.
People are the main commodity, the main potential of any C2 body. Alas, this tenet is once too often forgotten. While taking their operational training and accomplishing a range of other assigned tasks, Generals and officers of the JOC have acquired excellent professional qualifications and cohesion in their teamwork. As of today, the JOC has the highest among other operational level C2 structures percentage of officers with operational-strategic level training (some 27% in the table of organization) and those with operational-tactical training (some 46% in the table of organization).
The level reached by the JOC by now is manifested by results of each stage of its establishment.
So accomplishments of the first stage (2007) include laying of the JOC foundation as an operational level C2 structure designed for operational planning, command and control of UAF peacekeeping contingents; establishment of system for command and control of peacekeeping contingents. Also, on 1 January 2007, the JOC assumed operational command and control of peacekeeping contingents.
During the second stage (2008), work went on to improve legislation underpinning functioning and organizational structure of the JOC. In addition, the JOC assumed operational command and control of UAF capabilities assigned for emergency (crisis response) operations in peacetime. In the course of command-post exercises and training, JOC personnel tested algorithms for operations officers in the established command posts architecture.
All in all, having evaluated results of the first and second stages, General Staff leaders found the JOC capable of accomplishing assigned tasks according to its purpose.
However, upon the completion of the second stage, for a number of reasons (mostly objective ones, beyond the JOC’s control), the terms for assuming operational planning, command and control of UAF units assigned for situations identifies for the UAF employment were postponed.
The third and final stage of the JOC establishment commenced on 1 January 2009. The key task of this stage is a build-up of operational capabilities up to the level where the JOC will be able to execute operational planning, command and control of a task force. Accomplishment of all steps scheduled for this stage is supposed to make the JOC ready, from 2011 on, to take on all functions of command and control of assigned forces in all contingencies and situations identified for the UAF employment while continuing at the same time to build-up its operational capabilities.
It should also be noted that at the moment the JOC is the only operational level command and control body whose structure is close to the J-structure of C2 elements in the armed forces of developed countries and whose officers gain experience in planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations at the operational level after the UN and EU standards.
Lack of administrative management and training functions makes it possible to keep the JOC personnel in relatively insignificant numbers. That, in its turn, requires a minimum of financial allocations for its functional training and sustainment.
Thus, accomplishment of the rest of the JOC development activities by the end of 2011 will, by and large, enable its readiness for command and control tasks in all situations identified for the UAF employment.
Challenges
At the same time it would be premature to assert that all scheduled activities aimed at establishment and development of the JOC have been accomplished exactly the way it was meant originally by top officials in both the Defence Ministry and the General Staff.
First and foremost, one cannot help questioning the JOC’s ability to execute, on its own, the full scope of command and control of units assigned by the Ukrainian Air Force and the Navy. Our position is based on the fact that, as far as we know, provisions of the State Programme of the UAF Development during 2006-2011 stipulating that the Air Operations Centre and the Naval Operations Centre be incorporated into the JOC’s command and control circuit have not been implemented as yet.
Besides, due to its limited strength, the JOC requires reinforcement with operational groups from the Services and other UAF C2 structures for the duration of operations.
Another factor that can affect the JOC’s performance, first and foremost in the special period, is lack of own mobile control posts and necessary C2 assets. In addition, the UAF financial constraints made it impossible to provide the JOC with modern protected, portable and mobile communication and information management equipment.
At the same time, one can state that the JOC’s transition to the J-structure adopted by C2 elements in the armed forces of developed countries is not complete. For instance, analysis of its structure from open sources evinced lack of such element as Joint Operations Centre (standard for western countries), that is joint centre for operational command and control incorporated as an organic unit which enables command and control of ongoing operations in the modern and more effective fashion, virtually on-line.
The problem of insufficient number of operational personnel in the JOC is further aggravated by imperfection of operational planning, command and control processed adopted in the UAF. In our age of informational technology, it is hard to agree with approaches when the core of operational planning is effectively working out of its graphical component using topographical maps the size of a few dozen sheets of paper. Officers use pencils to put information (usually dispensable) on the maps manually. It stands to reason that even an thousand personnel will not suffice in any C2 structure practising such archaic techniques. In other words, the JOC has become a hostage to the situation when they are facing on the one hand modern operational planning, command and control requirements and on the other hand obsolete execution mechanisms established by directives.
An appreciable help in this situation would be to utilize capabilities of the Single Automated Command and Control System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces currently under development. By the way, it is the JOC that was supposed to become the testing ground for this system’s pilot project. Alas, the timely completion of its development is not an option any longer. Moreover, one cannot help getting an impression that this system will have become obsolete long before its official adoption.
Another exigent issue that has to be solved as soon as possible is direct subordination of existing C2, communications and support units to the JOC or peacetime forming of new such units which, under current conditions, can only be re-subordinated to the JOC for operational control in the special period. In peacetime, security units, signal units as well as operational, technical and logistic support units are subordinated to the General Staff and the Services. They can be employed only partly in support of the operational training done by the JOC.
We believe that the aforementioned problems have many reasons, but the paramount one is lack of unanimity as to the JOC’s role and place within the UAF Command and Control Architecture. This dissension, in its turn, distorts the way of practical implementation of ideas and plans which are, in themselves, entirely reasonable and opportune.
It stands to reason that a search for ways of the UAF C2 system development should be a continuous process. This issue has become particularly topical lately. It is no coincidence either, that 2010 was recognized as the year for improvement of the UAF C2 system.
Unfortunately, today we witness a somewhat unconstructive debate among experts regarding the middle-term and long-term outline of the UAF C2 system. And it sounds somewhat weird in this context when we hear that a question arose about restoration of the Army Operational Commands’ capabilities for operational planning, command and control of task forces while reducing at the same time the JOC’s tasks, strength and its table of organization (down to the level where it’s capable only of executing command and control of peacekeeping contingents)
Development Options or Instead of a Summary
It would be short-sighted and dangerous, to say the least, as well as economically burdensome for the state to subscribe to the point of view that establishment of the JOC in its present state has become a mistake and call for restoration of Operational Commands based on the territorial principle. Quite the contrary, the JOC’s tasks must be further restated and revised to increase their number and scope in terms of response to contemporary challenges that are continuously assuming new shapes and characteristics.
There is no need whatsoever to re-invent the wheel. Instead to looking for “new” farfetched options for the UAF C2 system development it would be more expedient to focus main efforts on implementation the State Programme of the UAF Development during 2006-2011 which stipulates transition to a three-step C2 system with appropriate functional distribution that goes as follows:
The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces functions as an executive body of the General HQ of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and organizes defence of the state.
The Joint Operational Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces executes operational planning, command and control of a joint (multiservice) task force in all situation identified for the UAF employment; UAF contingent in multinational peacekeeping operations; antiterrorist forces as well as forces assigned for disaster relief operations (in case of both natural and man-made disasters).
Service Commands (HQs) execute administrative direction of their respective forces to ensure their training, logistic support, replenishment, reinforcement and replacement of casualties, operational command and control of forces not re-subordinated operationally to the JOC, organization and execution of territorial defence (except for the Ukrainian Air Force) and training of reserves.
In order to facilitate further development of the JOC, the national legislation underpinning the JOC functioning must also be improved. In addition, the JOC’s organizational structure must be further developed and its strength increased. Fully-fledged elements for control of air and naval operations must be incorporated into the JOC’s structure. Also, the material basis of command and control must be further developed.
The JOC’s new task list must include preparation for and conduct of special operations, information and psychological warfare (including that in peacetime), acquiring of capabilities for functioning as C2 structure for multinational contingents in multinational peacekeeping operations. Needless to say, performance of all these tasks must meet modern standards.
The issue that should be discussed is quantitative and qualitative upgrade of the JOC’s structure up to the point when the JOC becomes self-sustained and independent in reinforcement with operational augmentation.
The fulfilment of the JOC’s potential here will be facilitated by establishment of a qualitatively new integrated structure – a separate command and control brigade. This structure must be formed using resources of the existing command and control, signal and support units.
Further development of the JOC must not be an end in itself. Instead, it must be aimed at establishment of a modern and effective C2 structure to respond to a wide spectrum of threats to the national security in support of Ukraine and its Armed Forces. Today, with the Defence Review underway and new UAF middle-term and long-term development plans being elaborated, there is a possibility to specify the directions, adjust the plans and make sure these plans are implemented by means of appropriate resources.
O.Volkov, Colonel (retired), Independent Expert, former Chief of the Operations Directorate, Army HQ
