The article deals with the current state as well as challenges that hamper functioning of, and cooperation between, the Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in present conditions. These challenges are so complicated and inextricably interconnected with the state management system in the of security and defence domain that any attempts to find simple and quick ways of tackling these challenges are inevitably doomed to failure. With this in mind, the article proffers only factual material, considers the present state and suggests practicable remedies.
Setting the Scene
After Ukraine got its independence in 1991 and embarked on development of its own Armed Forces, the originally Main and subsequently General Staff was formed as part of the Defence Ministry. In this scheme, the Chief of the General Staff was First Deputy Defence Minister of Ukraine. These were the foundations underpinning the establishment and development process for more than ten years.
The decision on distribution of functions between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was made in 204 in the course of the Defence Review in Ukraine. The decision was based on tasks set at that time by the President of Ukraine. It also corresponded to the administrative reform initiated by the President and was consistent with Ukraine’s declared strategic course towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
The Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine until 2015 (SDB) states that distribution of functions and authority between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff is an integral part and an indispensable element of the democratic civilian control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
According to the SDB the Ukrainian Defence Ministry (as a central executive agency) must focus its attention on development and implementation of the state defence policy whereas its effort must be concentrated on policy development, defence planning, finances and ensuring practical implementation of political decisions in the aforementioned domain.
At the same time, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, subordinated to the Defence Ministry, was to become the main agency responsible for maintenance of operational readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operational planning; direction and coordination of operational issues in the defence domain.
The pattern used for establishment of the military command and control structure, including the strategic level, was the adopted by most European NATO member states model for distribution of tasks and functions between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff by military-political, administrative and operational fields of activity.
Analysis of the international best practices in terms of distribution of authority between defence ministries and general staffs evinces existence of three models, namely:
Integrated Defence Ministry (Austria, the UK, Germany, Slovakia):
· the Defence Ministry functions as a civilian Ministry; at the same time it acts as a Command&Control element within the Armed Forces structure (Germany) of a single public management system in the defence domain;
· the Defence Ministry represents the military-political component whereas the General Staff embodies the military control component (Slovakia);
· the Chief of the General Staff is a Deputy Defence Minister;
The Defence Ministry and the General Staff are two separated structures (Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Finland):
· the Defence Ministry functions as a civilian authority;
· the Defence Ministry structure provides for both civilian and military posts;
· the General Staff is a military Command&Control body;
The Defence Ministry and the General Staff are separate structures but they share authority in some areas (science an d technology, information management, inspection) (Canada):
The Ukrainian Strategic Defence Bulletin established that the military-political direction provided by the Defence Ministry must include the following tasks:
contribute to implementation of the state policy in the defence and military development domain;
identify the level of military threat to the Ukrainian national security;
strategic planning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces development;
sustainment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
implementation of the military-technical policy;
ensure development of military education and science;
implement the military personnel policy and the military social policy of the state;
control and monitor observance of the current legislation; create favourable conditions for the democratic civilian control over the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The SDB also established operational control functions to be performed by the General Staff towards the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
strategic planning of employment of the Armed Forces and other military formations;
ensure functioning of Command&Control system for both the Armed Forces and other military formations;
execute tasking; organize and monitor accomplishment of assigned tasks;
identify requirements and resources needed to accomplish assigned tasks; monitor delivery of these resources;
organize training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
monitor combat readiness and mobilization readiness, combat efficiency of Command&Control elements and forces;
identify their need for personnel, materiel and resources required to accomplish assigned tasks;
organize manning of the Armed Forces and other military formations.
Table 1 represents the statutory distribution of authority between the Defence Minister and the Chief of the General Staff – Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the areas of military-political direction, administrative management and direct military control as established by the Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (of 06.12.91 № 1934-XII, Article VIII “Direction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, the version of 25.12.2008 № 803-VI).
In addition, powers and main functions of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff in the defence domain and in terms of control and direction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been enshrined in the Law of Ukraine “On Defence of Ukraine” (of 06.12.91 № 1932-XII, subsequently amended by Act № 662-IV of 03.04.2003, Act № 1003-IV of 19.06.2003, and Act № 803-VI of 25.12.2008), Regulations on the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Cabinet’s Resolution № 1080 of 03.08.06) and Regulations on the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (President’s Decree № 769/2006 of 21.09.06) (See Table 2).
Thus a number of steps have been taken in Ukraine to establish distribution of authority between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, and make appropriate amendments to statutory acts. At the same time, analysis of the actual implementation of the aforesaid distribution in routine activities of the Ukrainian troops evinces certain problems. The actual extent of fulfilment of the planned measures is handled in the subsequent sections.
Anticipated Advantages
According to this model, the military-political and administrative control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces become responsibility of the Defence Ministry with a civilian Defence Minster at the helm. Such lie of the land ensures reliable civilian public control over the national military domain. And this is considered to be the overriding advantage in delimitation of functions and responsibilities of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff.
At the same time, it should be noted that results obtained over the five years of introduction of the democratic civilian control evoke mixed feeling and emotions among the military. For instance, The Defence and Security Policy Centre carried out a survey on its Internet web-site (the survey only reflects the opinion of the site visitors and by no means purports to be representative). The question was “What has implementation of the civilian democratic control over the military domain in Ukraine, in its present form, become for the Armed Forces?” Only slightly over 8% take a positive view: gaining an attribute of a democratic state’s army, preventing a possibility of domination over the public – 4,2%; increased public concern about the Ukrainian Armed Forces and assistance with tackling of urgent challenges – 4,2%. Nearly half of the respondents appraised the present state of the civilian control as irresponsibility of all branches of the state power for the state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (48,3%). 11,9% believe that it has disrupted the command and control system and made distribution of functions between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff a total shambles.
The Defence Ministry must execute military-political direction and administrative military management through the Service Commands (Forces Support Command) – administrative management agencies at the operational-strategic level. Taking this into account, the Commanders of the Services must be subordinated directly to the Defence Minister of Ukraine. He is also responsible for military-political direction and administrative management of the Armed Forces. In special period (a euphemism for a period other than peacetime) he ensures strategic deployment and use of the UAF (Para.2, Article VIII and Para. 9, Article XI of the Cabinet’s Resolution № 1080 “On Approval of the Regulations on the Defence Ministry of Ukraine” of 03.08.06). At the same time there is no understanding among specialist and experts of ways of practical implementation of the above-stated provisions.
According to the presented model, the General Staff must concentrate on planning of the defence of the state as well as operational command and control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the course of their training and employment. The General Staff executes operational command and control through the Headquarters of the Services and the Joint Operational Command.
There is no doubt that such a distribution was rational in view of political decisions made by the state leaders. This distribution also made it possible to eliminated duplication of some functions, increase effectiveness of their fulfilment, optimize the structure and downsize Command&Control elements, bringing them closer to NATO standards. The last achievement was prerequisite in case Ukraine was to join the Alliance and contribute to joint operations in the future.
At the same time it should be noted that this model of distribution of authority among the military command and control bodies was never fully implemented.
So one can conclude that, as far as advantages of the given management model are concerned, the Armed Forces contrived to implement a certain level of the democratic civilian control which, nevertheless, requires further improvement. Introduction of other components of this model produced results that are rather controversial and demand scrutiny by experts.
At the same time, lessons learnt make it possible to analyse problems that the Defence Ministry and the General Staff leaders had to encounter along the way.
Challenges of Today
One can state today, that implementation of this model (implementation steps were established by the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine till 2015 and specified by the State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development during 2006-2011) failed for varied reasons.
What happened instead of distribution of authority between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff and elimination of duplication was, in effect, establishment of two somewhat similar (in terms of their functions) military command and control structures providing direction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the strategic level.
However experts repeatedly emphasised an important difference between these two command and control structures, the difference being asymmetric responsibility. Performance of individual MoD structures is evaluated without regard to effectiveness and adequacy of the UAF sustainment whereas the General Staff is fully responsible for combat readiness and training of the troops regardless of the availability of resources and with no power to influence provision of these resources or monitor the process.
Today, administrative management and military direction are executed by both the Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. There is certain – sometimes morbid – rivalry in these areas which complicates making of well thought-out decisions, in particular when in comes to prioritization and financing of equipment revamp, development of command and control automation systems, implementation of humanitarian and personnel policy (military education) in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, international military cooperation, etc.
Specialists in the Main State Service, as independent experts, believe that the key problem is the Defence Ministry’s focusing excessive attention on tactical issues of direction and control of routine daily activities of forces. There are a large number of military units, military education and training facilities, institution and UAF organizations directly subordinated to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry. Altogether, they outnumber individual Services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Providing direction and control of these subordinated units consumes a considerable amount of time. At the same time, Defence Ministry department fail to pay due attention to such issues as contribution to development and implementation of the state policy in the Armed Forces.
On the other hand, the General Staff, responsible for the state of the Armed Forces and their training, severely hampered by the economic crisis, without adequate support from the Defence Ministry in terms of meeting material and financial requirements, is taking over the increasing number of administrative functions. This, in its turn, draws General Staff experts away from their main function, namely planning of the defence of the state and preparation for executing command and control of the Armed Forces during their employment.
The Command&Control structure is also unbalanced, in a measure, by a regulation stipulating that the Chief of the General Staff becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is case a civilian Defence Minister is appointed. In this situation, the two officials’ scope of authority and responsibility for direction, command and control of the Armed Forces inevitably overlap.
In a situation like this effectiveness of the UAF C&C system becomes contingent not on the statutory distribution of authority but, rather, on the leaders’ personal qualities and their ability to cooperate. This article not having been designed to analyse relations between certain individuals, the authors will confine themselves to offering some information of senior officials of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff since 1996 (Table 3).
At the same, in order to ensure effectiveness of the Armed Forces management system, it must be freed from this dependence on personality. Instead, a clear-cut and transparent legal basis regulating distribution of authority and responsibilities must be established. To achieve this, the human factor influence on effectiveness of the system as a whole must be reduced to the very minimum. It stands to reason that no regulations or statutory acts have the power to make direction and management process completely independent from interpersonal relations between officials. This is why attention should be focused on eliminating the dominating negative influence these relations may exert on the outcome of any activity.
The lot of Service Commands (the Forces Support Command) and the Operational Command remains yet unregulated by statutory acts. Their status and place within the military C2 structure was originally established by the Strategic Defence Bulletin and the State Programme of the Armed Forces Development. The status and place that have remained unchanged since the approval of these two documents are no longer consistent with the present state of affairs.
As a result, due to their incomplete reformation, C2 elements, including the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, do not fully meet the command and control requirements of the Armed Forces today either for Ukraine’s joining a collective security system or for ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine single-handed. All this urges one to look for ways to remedy the present situation.
Obvious Solutions
First and foremost, further development of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces must be considered in the framework of development of both public authorities in general and the UAF military direction and management structures in particular.
According to some defence management experts (G.Bukur-Marku, F.Fluri, T.Tagarev, “Defence Management: Introduction”), distribution of functions among civilian and military leaders as well as their subordinates is an issue of the utmost significance, provided management is regarded as an organizational amplifier and not as a substitute to well-arranged command and control procedures. Management here must be primary responsibility of civilian leaders whereas military commanders must retain their functions without turning into managers. At the same time, as far as defence management, especially one at the strategic level, is concerned, the demarcation line between roles of civilians and the military is rather blurred.
In the Ukrainian realities, one must remember that the Defence Ministry is a central executive agency that ensures implementation of the state policy in the defence domain.
The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is a main military body that plans defence of the state, directs employment of the Armed Forces, coordinates and monitors accomplishment of defence tasks by executive authorities and local government institutions, military formations established under Ukrainian laws and law enforcement agencies within the boundaries set by this Law, other laws of Ukraine as well as decrees and resolution of the President, the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers. During the special period, the General Staff functions as an executive body of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Secondly, as far as the Defence Ministry and the General Staff are concerned, no effective distribution of authority and optimization of the structure can be done unless the strategic course of the country is clearly identified at the national level. The military professionals are particularly keenly aware of the contradiction engendered by the declared nonaligned status and Ukraine’s unchanging strategic course towards the European integration. For them, the former implies build-up of the UAF combat potential, making the UAF capable of unassisted defence of national territory and establishment of the appropriate military command and control architecture. As for the European integration, it implies adjustment of the national military C2 system to the standards adopted by European countries in order to acquire capabilities required for future joint operations including those to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It should also be noted that no changes in the command and control architecture can be introduced without appropriate adjustments to the material basis of the command and control system, i.e. communications and automated C2 systems as well as command posts. Beginning of reformation of the Defence Ministry, the General Staff and other C2 elements was to have coincided with establishment of the Single Integrated Automated Command and Control System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, introduction of modern digital technology and communication facilities. The failure to accomplish these tasks today one of the reasons why reformation of the military command and control architecture, including the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, hasn’t been completed.
In view of the above-stated, there are several ways for further development of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. In principle, these ways can be generalized into three main options.
The first option provides for increased role of the Defence Ministry. It must concentrate on contribution to development and implementation of the state policy in the defence domain, administrative (direct) management of the Armed Forces in peacetime and comprehensive support to their training. The Defence Minister here bears full responsibility for the state of the Armed Forces. Commanders of the Services are subordinated directly to the Defence Minster. Service Commands implement the Service development policy and train units for operation as part of joint forces.
The General Staff’s authority and responsibilities in this case are narrowed down to strategic planning of employment and development of the Armed Forces and other military formations as well as operational command and control of these forces during training and employment. As far the operational command and control of the Armed Forces is concerned, the chain of command includes the Joint Operational Command, Service HQs, and Operational Command HQs. Besides, the General Staff identifies UAF requirements and monitors how these requirements are met by central executive agencies, including the Defence Ministry.
The second option implies increased role of the General Staff which will assume in full all functions of administrative (direct) and operational direction of the Armed Forces. In order to do this, the General Staff should establish within its structure efficient logistic elements, first of all, at the expense of corresponding departments in the Defence Ministry. Almost all military units, military education and training facilities, institutions and organizations currently subordinated to the Defence Ministry must be re-subordinated to the General Staff. The authority to manage the humanitarian and social areas as well as personnel issues should also be transferred from MoD departments to the General Staff.
The Defence Ministry in this case will remain responsible solely for contribution to development of the state policy in the defence and military development domain, coordination of other executive agencies to this effect and sustainment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The third option – transition to the integrated Defence Ministry and the General Staff. This option makes it easier to integrate individual structures of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, concentrate their efforts on accomplishment of tasks assigned to both the defence agency and the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a whole. In such a system, the Chief of the General Staff at the same time holds the post of the First Deputy Defence Minister.
Anticipating likely remarks, it should be noted that this option may look like a reversion to the direction system that had existed in the Ukrainian Armed Forces up until 2004. But it is not quite so. The comparison should be made not with the Ukrainian Armed Forces that existed ten years ago, but rather with similar systems in democratic countries where such integration is being put into practice. Attention should be focused on making the most of advantages of such a system and maintaining high standards of democratic civilian control over the military organization.
It stands to reason that, over the past few years, development of legal basis to underpin management of the UAF has been done, so to speak, in the direction opposite to implementation of such a system whose introduction will now be hampered by various legislation obstacles. But this must not be reason enough to discard this option as one worth consideration.
It should be noted that as of today, the new leaders of the Defence Ministry faced by the financial crisis and economic recession are looking for ways to reduce their staff. This task (downsizing state authorities by 20%) has been set by the state leaders. At the same time, while accomplishing this task, one must take into account such factor as amount of tasks in the military domain and their distribution between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff.
There may be an evident temptation in these circumstances – when there is no clear-cut delineation of functions by areas of activity (sustainment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, military-technical activity, etc.) – to carry out certain re-distribution of tasks between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff regardless of functionality and based solely on requirements of the current situation.
At the same time it must be taken into account that redistribution of functions provided for the General Staff functioning as an independent structure with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the helm. This is why necessary GS structures were established – from the Main Financial-Economic Directorate and to the Press Office. Today’s attempts to get rid of these units inherent in an independent structure may limit the Commander’s-in-Chief capabilities to fulfil his functions in executing military direction of the Armed Forces.
Besides, there are a number of areas where the Defence Ministry and the General Staff share authority not regulated by statutory documents. These areas include, in particular:
· strategic planning;
· mobilization and training of reserves;
· designing of new weapons and equipment;
· sustainment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
· development of military education and science;
· international cooperation and peacekeeping;
· solving of humanitarian policy and social security issues;
· management of military materiel.
We’d like to dwell on sustainment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This issue may require a compromise between the MoD’s and the GS’s views more than others. The approach prevailing among MoD officials is a discernable endeavour to provide everyone with everything while keeping everything under personal control. This attitude engenders paradoxical situations when representatives of a MoD department try to organize catering for a military unit stationed hundreds of kilometres away from Kiev by a commercial enterprise.
The military usually take a different position – sustainment of the Armed Forces must for the Defence Ministry imply allocation of funds and organization of coordination with the defence industrial complex and other enterprises, thus leaving it to appropriate military C2 elements to support their subordinated units and institution. There is a grain of truth in it – peacetime sustainment is linked to wartime sustainment – this is why is should be handled by the military.
There is yet another approach standing somewhat apart from the rest and containing a kernel of good sense in view of today’s actualities in Ukraine. Some individuals will continue to be attracted by this issue for as long as such phenomenon as corruption remains widespread, for what these individuals are interested in is not sustainment of forces but a possibility of controlling cash flows. Organization of this process after European standards with proved anti-corruption effect will facilitate considerable reduction of the scale of this negative phenomenon if not eliminate it altogether.
It should also be taken into account that, regardless of the option preferred, organization of close cooperation between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff at the deputies and structural units level is one of the main preconditions that will enable rational distribution of responsibilities among them as well as optimization of their structure and strength.
Adoption of the first or the second option as a starting point (any other alternative option may also be suggested) will require amendments to the legislation, clearer delineation of areas of responsibility and distribution of authority between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. The peculiarity of their relations is unique and has no analogues in other areas of public management. It requires not only equally unique approach, but also, in view of its importance for the security and the very existence of the state, an in-depth analysis, and a carefully weighed approach from the national perspective.
